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Economics has long been known as the
dismal science. So catastrophes – natural,
man-made, economic, medical – would
seem to be the perfect subject matter for
economists. And so they are: the
discipline now ranges freely across the
full range of modern human concerns,
including the global challenges of
terrorism, extreme poverty, poor health
and climate change.
But as several articles in this issue of
CentrePiece show, some of the most
recent findings of top-quality economic
research are far from dismal. Indeed, they
suggest a far more positive view of the
future than those espoused by prophets
of doom in certain other fields of enquiry
and many activists in thinktanks, pressure
groups and political campaigning.
Shocking events like the 9/11 attacks
on New York do set the economy back
but things recover pretty quickly.
Increased resources for policing can have
an impact in cutting crime. The rise of
China is not going to be a disaster for all
sectors and all workers in the old
industrialised countries. And a little
education – for both children and their
parents – has the potential to go a long
way in reducing disease and early death
in the poorer nations of the world.
Of course, what many people
consider to be the greatest catastrophe
of all is human-induced global warming.
Again though, economists tend to be
relatively optimistic. The recent review led
by Sir Nicholas Stern acknowledged that
addressing climate change demands
strong and costly action – but that need
not be a major obstacle to future
prosperity. Ralf Martin will examine
policies for reducing carbon emissions in
our next issue. In the meantime, our
website has his recent CEP policy analysis
on the topic: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/briefings/
pa_climate_change.pdf.
Elsewhere on the website, there is
more on the theme of catastrophe,
including an audio interview with Alan
Krueger of Princeton University who
delivered the Lionel Robbins Memorial
Lectures earlier this year on the causes
and consequences of terrorism:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/interviews/default.asp.
There is also our latest policy analysis,
which focuses on the European 
Union’s ‘Lisbon agenda’ for boosting
innovation and productivity growth:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/briefings/default.asp.
As always, your comments on our
policy analyses and the articles in
CentrePiece would be very welcome. And
do pass the magazine on to colleagues
who might appreciate learning that even
in the face of catastrophe, some dismal
scientists can be surprisingly upbeat.
Romesh Vaitilingam
Editor
romesh@compuserve.com
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Major events like the terrorist attacks on
New York of 11 September 2001 generate
large but typically short-lived bursts of
uncertainty. New research by Nick Bloom
explores the effects of such shocks on
employment, investment and productivity –
and how monetary policy-makers should
decide on the ideal response.
The economic
impact of 9/11
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W
hat is the
impact of
shocks like
high-profile
terrorist attacks
on firms’ hiring
and investment decisions and on their
productivity? My research finds big short-
run effects from the fear and uncertainty:
a temporary drop in GDP as everyone
pauses and the economy freezes. But six
months on from one-off incidents like
9/11, the uncertainty effects are much
more muted as firms resume activity and
make up for lost time. 
There has been extensive research on
the impact of major shocks via the levels
of future demand and productivity  – what
economists call ‘first moment’ effects
(examined in the research literature on
business cycles). But until now, there has
been very little investigation of the
uncertainty – or ‘second moment’ –
effects of economic and political shocks.
This is surprising as it turns out that
uncertainty shocks occur regularly. As
Figure 1 shows, uncertainty – as measured
by the widely accepted indicator of
monthly stock market volatility – doubled
after events like the Cuban missile crisis,
the assassination of President Kennedy,
the Gulf War and 9/11. 
The closest previous work to mine was
done as a doctoral thesis over 20 years
ago by the current chairman of the US
Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke. Indeed, in
a way, my study is a test of the ‘Bernanke
hypothesis’: extending his examination of
the impact of uncertainty on investment to
its effects on hiring and productivity;
quantifying it using firm-level data; and
confirming via a simulation the prediction
that the response to an uncertainty shock
is a rapid drop and rebound in economic
activity.
Comparing the simulated data with
actual data from the period immediately
following 9/11 produces a remarkably
good fit. Figure 2, which plots actual
quarterly changes in net employment,
shows that there was a sharp drop in net
employment growth in the quarter after
9/11, with a rapid rebound in the first
quarter of 2002.
Figure 1:
Monthly US stock market volatility, 1962-2006
Note: The vertical axis shows a percentage measure of volatility known as ‘annualised standard
deviation’. Prior to 1986, this is calculated as the percentage actual volatility of monthly returns
on the S&P500 index of the US stock market. After 1986, it is calculated using the percentage
‘implied volatility’ from an option on the S&P100 index.
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9/11 led to
the loss of
one million
jobs and
investment
equivalent to
3% of GDP
over the next
four months
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The immediate decrease was the
largest quarterly fall in employment growth
since 1980, and compared with predicted
employment changes from the consensus
forecasts of 23 August 2001, 9/11 appears
to have generated a net job loss of one
million jobs in the subsequent four
months. But comparison with the forecasts
for further ahead suggests that there was
little longer-run fall in employment growth.
The data for quarterly investment as a
percentage contribution to real GDP
growth follow a similar pattern. As Figure
3 shows, there was a sharp fall after 9/11,
with the last quarter of 2001 representing
the lowest quarterly value for investment
since 1982.
Again, compared with the pre-9/11
consensus forecasts, the short-run effects
were large – with the drop in investment
cutting annual GDP growth by about 3%
over the subsequent four months. But
there was a rapid bounceback in the first
quarter of 2002 and there were no
apparent longer-run effects.
Central bank statements of the time
provide a broader confirmation of the
uncertainty that 9/11 created. Figure 4
plots the frequency of the word ‘uncertain’
in the minutes of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC), which displays a clear
jump and subsequent decay around 9/11.
For example, the minutes of 2 October
2001 said:
‘The events of September 11 produced a
marked increase in uncertainty…
depressing investment by fostering an
increasingly widespread wait-and-see
attitude about undertaking new
investment expenditures.’
Almost two months later, on 27
November, FOMC member and president
of the Chicago Federal Reserve Board
Michael Moskow commented:
‘Because the attack significantly
heightened uncertainty, it appears that
some households and some businesses
would enter a wait-and-see mode… They
are putting capital spending plans on
hold.’
The FOMC minutes of 6 November
noted the additional effects of uncertainty
on risk aversion:
‘The heightened degree of uncertainty and
Figure 2:
US quarterly net hiring 
Figure 3:
US quarterly investment
Note: The vertical axis measures quarterly changes in net employment in the private sector (in
thousands of people); the data are from the Current Employment Statistics survey produced by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics; the forecast is an average of 33 economic forecasters collected by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia on 23 August 2001.
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Note: The vertical axis measures the quarterly percentage contribution of investment to real
GDP growth; the data are from the National Income and Product Accounts produced by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis; the forecast is an average of 33 economic forecasters collected by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia on 23 August 2001.
risk aversion following the terrorist attack
seemed to be having a pronounced effect
on business and household spending.’
And other central banks also discussed
this phenomenon. For example, the 17
October minutes of the Bank of England’s
Monetary Policy Committee stated that:
‘A general increase in uncertainty could
lead to a greater reluctance to make
commitments… Labour hiring and
discretionary spending are likely to be
deferred for a while, to allow time for the
situation to clarify.’
Uncertainty is clearly a ubiquitous
concern of monetary policy-makers – and
it becomes of particular importance in the
immediate aftermath of a major shock.
When deciding whether to adopt a
contractionary, neutral or expansionary
stance in response, it is critical to
distinguish between persistent first
moment effects (which will generate a
drop in activity lasting several quarters)
and temporary second moment effects like
those of 9/11 (which will generate a big
drop in the first month but a complete
rebound by six months out).
My research suggests two pieces of
information that monetary policy-makers
might use to assess the likely impact of
any shock. The first thing to look at is
measures of financial uncertainty from
indices of implied stock market volatility.
The second is the spread of activity across
firms: first moment shocks will lead to a
fall in activity across all firms while a
second moment shock will lead to a
compression of activity across firms. 
Given the rapid drop and rebound
from second moment shocks and the long
delays in monetary policy, the best
response is a limited one. So the cautious
stabilisation pursued by the Federal
Reserve and the Bank of England in late
2001 looks entirely appropriate based on
these results, and with hindsight was
proved correct. 
The rapid
drop in
economic
activity was
followed by 
a strong
rebound 
with limited
longer-term
impact
Figure 4:
Frequency of the word ‘uncertain’ in the minutes of the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
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This article summarises ‘The Impact of
Uncertainty Shocks: Firm Level Estimation
and a 9/11 Simulation’ by Nick Bloom, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 718
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0718.pdf).
Nick Bloom is an assistant professor of
economics at Stanford University and a
research associate in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme.
Further reading
Ben Bernanke (1983), ‘Irreversibility,
Uncertainty and Cyclical Investment’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 85-106.
Source: FOMC minutes; note that the FOMC typically meets only eight times a year so some
months have no meetings.
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Panic on the 
streets of London
The terrorist attacks of 7 July 2005 resulted
in a very large redeployment of police
officers to central London boroughs. New
research by Mirko Draca, Stephen Machin
and Robert Witt looks at the impact of this
increased security presence on criminal
activity in the weeks and months after the
bomb blasts.
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ncreasing police resources is
often perceived as a primary
tool for reducing crime – but
there is little hard evidence
showing that more police do in
fact reduce crime. The main
reason for this is that it has been difficult
to disentangle the causal relationship
between the two: higher crime usually
means more police and vice versa.
As a result, it is difficult for
governments and observers of public
policy to evaluate the effectiveness of
increasing police resources in comparison
with other possible causes of falling crime
rates, such as increased incarceration rates
and improved economic conditions.
This problem has led researchers to
consider the impact of unexpected
changes in police deployment on crime
rates. These types of changes are often
characterised as ‘natural experiments’ – a
research design based on events, which
tries to reproduce the conditions of a
scientific experiment without the pre-
design that is available in controlled
laboratory conditions.
For example, our research looks at
police activity in central London in the
wake of the 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks.
Police deployment increased by over 30%
in the six weeks immediately following the
bombings, and the massive scale of this
response provides a good opportunity to
examine the causal relationship between
the number of police deployed and the
crime rate. 
Specifically, our research investigates
what the heightened security presence did
to criminal activity in the five London
boroughs that were hit. The central
finding is that crime fell significantly in
these places relative to outer London in
the six weeks immediately after the
attacks. Furthermore, crime appears to be
highly responsive to higher police
deployment – we calculate that a 10%
increase in police deployment reduces the
crime rate by approximately 3%.
7/7 as a natural experiment
As will be familiar to most readers,
London’s public transport system was
subject to two waves of attacks in July
2005. The first wave occurred on 7 July
and involved the detonation of four
bombs. Three bombs were detonated on
London Underground trains near the
stations of Russell Square (in the borough
of Camden), Liverpool Street (Tower
Hamlets) and Edgware Road (Kensington
and Chelsea). A fourth bomb was
detonated on a bus in Tavistock Square,
Bloomsbury (Camden).
The second wave of attacks occurred
two weeks later on 21 July and involved
four unsuccessful attempts at detonating
bombs on trains near the stations of
Shepherds Bush (Kensington and
Table 1:
Police deployment and crime rates before and after the 7/7 attacks, borough level
Central London 171.41 190.34 +18.93 4.26 3.88 -0.38
‘treatment’ boroughs
Outer London 84.19 85.40 +1.21 2.20 2.16 -0.04
‘control’ boroughs
Note: The central London ‘treatment’ boroughs are Camden, Islington, Kensington and Chelsea, Tower Hamlets and Westminster.
Police deployment is defined as total weekly hours worked by police staff at borough-level.
Pre-period:
8 July 2004 to 31
December 2004
Post-period:
7 July 2005 to 31
December 2005
Difference Pre-period:
8 July 2004 to 31
December 2004
Post-period:
7 July 2005 to 31
December 2005
Difference
Police deployment
(Hours worked per 1,000 population)
Crime rate
(Crimes per 1,000 population)
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Chelsea), the Oval (Lambeth) and Warren
Street (Westminster), and on a bus in
Bethnal Green (Tower Hamlets). This
second wave of attacks caused much
turmoil in London.
The bomb attacks took place in five
boroughs in central London and we have
used these parts of the capital as the
‘treatment’ areas that were most affected
in terms of a heightened security
presence. We also need a set of control
areas against which we can benchmark
the observed changes in the treatment
boroughs. We therefore use other
boroughs located in outer London as the
comparison group. Figure 1 shows the 32
London boroughs, picking out the five in
the treatment group.
Basic street-level policing of London is
carried out by 33 borough operational
command units, which operate within the
same boundaries as the 32 London
borough councils plus one dedicated to
Heathrow Airport. Our data are
constituted of daily police reports of crime
from the London Metropolitan Police
Service before and after the attacks. 
They cover the period 1 January 2004 to
31 December 2005, aggregated up from
ward to borough level and from days to
weeks over the two-year period. 
The impact of increased
police deployment
Table 1 reports police deployment and
crime rates before and after the attacks.
Note that in this part of the analysis, we
define the post-attack period as the
whole period from the 7/7 attacks until
the very end of 2005. So what do the
data reveal?
Before the attacks, the hours worked
by the police per head of population were
higher in the central London treatment
boroughs: 171.41 hours per 1,000 people
compared with about half that in the
control boroughs. After the attacks,
deployment levels remained much the
same in the control areas (85 hours per
1,000 people compared with 84 the year
before) but rose very rapidly in central
London: by 19 hours per 1,000 people,
an increase of 11% over the level in the
previous year.
The patterns of change in the total
crime rate are similar. As with
deployment, the crime rate was higher in
central London before the attacks at 4.3
Hillingdon
Harrow
Barnet
Enfield
Haringey Waltham
Forest
Redbridge
Barking and 
Dagenham
Havering
Bexley
Bromley
Greenwich
Lewisham
CroydonSutton
Merton
Kingston
upon
Thames
Richmond
upon Thames
Hounslow
Ealing
Brent
2.
1.
3. 4.
City of 
London
5.
Newham
TREATMENT AREAS
1 Kensington 
 & Chelsea
2. City of Westminster
3. Camden
4. Islington
5 Tower Hamlets
Miles 0 2 4 6 8 10
Hackney
Wandsworth
Hammersmith 
& Fulham
Lambeth
Southwark
Figure 1:
A map of London boroughs
Crime fell
significantly
in central
London
relative 
to outer
London in 
the six weeks
after 7 July
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crimes per 1,000 people compared with
2.2 per 1,000 in the control boroughs.
After the attacks, the crime rate changed
very little in outer London, but in central
London, crime fell very sharply to 3.9
crimes per 1,000 people, a 7% fall in the
crime rate.
Our basic analysis strongly suggests
that increased police presence after the
London bomb attacks was linked to
reduced crime levels. But there are several
reasons why reaching this conclusion may
be premature. There may be missing
factors that determine crime, for example,
the number of potential crime victims
might have fallen after the attacks
occurred (with fewer people travelling
into central London) and this, rather than
increased police presence, could have
been the key driving factor.
Our more detailed analysis deals with
some of these possibilities. For example,
throughout the rest of 2005 after the
attacks, police deployment in central
London was about 8.5% higher than
before. But levels of deployment were
actually much higher in the six weeks
after 7/7 at 34% higher. Between the end
of August and December 2005, police
deployment levels fell back to their 
pre-attack levels.
Crime fell significantly after 7/7 at an
average of 6.3% over the remaining
weeks of 2005. But again, as with police
deployment, there was significant
variation across the first six weeks and the
rest of the year. The data show a 12%
lower crime rate in the six weeks
following 7/7 – the period when the
heightened security presence occurred –
and a smaller 4.5% lower level in the
remaining weeks of the year.
The respective timings of the increase
in police deployment and the fall in crime
very much suggest that the increased
security presence lowered crime. When
the estimates for police deployment and
crime are considered together, they
suggest that a 10% increase in police
activity reduces crime by around 3%.
The results so far show a significant
causal impact of police on crime. But it
seems reasonable to think that particular
types of crime are more likely to have
fallen. We can thus look at different crime
types to provide a reality check on our
results. The results (reported in our
forthcoming CEP working paper) are
reassuring. For public thefts and violent
crime (two types of crime where we
would expect increased police presence in
central London to have an impact), there
were significant reductions in crime after
the attacks.
What’s more, the effect was bigger in
the six weeks in which the increase in
police deployment was concentrated,
providing further verification of our main
hypothesis. Analysis of borough-specific
effects also shows that crime fell
significantly in all of the affected
boroughs, with stronger effects evident in
Westminster and Tower Hamlets.
This article summarises ‘Panic on the Streets
of London: Police, Crime and the July 2005
Terror Attacks’ by Mirko Draca, Stephen
Machin and Robert Witt, a forthcoming CEP
Discussion Paper.
Mirko Draca is a research economist in
CEP’s productivity and innovation
programme. Stephen Machin is CEP’s
research director. Robert Witt is at the
University of Surrey.
These
findings
suggest that
a 10%
increase in
police
activity
reduces
crime by
around 3%
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The economic emergence of the world’s most
populous nation is having a big impact on
everyone else. Tony Venables and Linda Yueh
analyse which countries, industries and workers
are likely to benefit and which may lose out from
the continuing challenge of the China effect.
The 
China 
effect
C
hina is a developing
country in the midst of
making the transition to
a market economy. Yet
it is already emerging as
a major force in the
world economy, and increasingly looks like
a developed country – one that accounts
for 20% of the world’s population, more
than four times the size of the United
States and nearly three times that of the
European Union.
China’s size and integration with the
world economy have contributed to
uncertainty about the global inflationary
environment; its currency has been a
subject of contention; its trade has raised
concerns for workers and firms in both
developed and developing countries; its
demand for energy has led to competition
and conflict; it has rivalled the United
States, the UK and developing countries as
a destination for foreign direct investment;
and the effects of its own overseas
investments have begun to be felt across
the world. As a result, China has
generated incremental growth in the
global economy that has made its success
significant for the welfare of other
countries.
Here we present an outline of the
China effect and set out some of the key
numbers, drawing on data from the
National Bureau of Statistics in China,
UNCTAD, the World Bank and the World
Trade Organisation (WTO). We argue that
the rise of China will benefit the process
of globalisation, but it will also raise
significant challenges for national
economic structures and competitiveness
in the rest of the world.
Chinese growth and trade
Since the process of economic
liberalisation began in 1979, China’s
economic performance has been
remarkable. With an average growth rate
of 9.4% a year in real terms, GDP has
increased twelve-fold, while Chinese trade
with the rest of the world has risen by a
factor of 30. As Figure 1 shows, China’s
GDP has overtaken Canada, Italy and the
UK in the last decade, and is on course to
overtake Germany by 2007. It will soon
become the world’s third largest economy,
after the United States and Japan.
These numbers are at market
exchange rates, so they grossly understate
the real size of the Chinese economy once
adjustment is made for the country’s
relatively low cost of living. China’s per
capita income at market exchange rates is
$1,700, but estimates of its per capita
income adjusted for the cost of living (that
is, at ‘purchasing power parity’) are four
times higher, at $7,200.
We can make a vivid comparison
between the size of the UK and Chinese
economies by comparing the two
countries’ installed capacity for electricity
generation. At nearly 400GW, Chinese
generating capacity is around five times
larger than that of the UK, and each year,
China is adding capacity equal to the total
UK capacity.
CentrePiece Autumn 2006
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Figure 1:
Real GDP, in millions of US dollars, 1980-2004
Source: World Bank; note that figures are at current market exchange rates not ‘purchasing power parity’ (PPPs).
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A startling aspect of China’s economic
performance is its degree of openness to
international trade. Total Chinese trade
(exports plus imports) amounts to 70% of
its GDP, which compares with 37% for the
UK and just 20% for the United States.
China’s trade/GDP ratio is all the more
remarkable given that one of the main
determinants of this number is country
size – large countries typically have low
shares of trade in GDP (for example, the
United States compared with the UK).
One reason why China’s trade/GDP
ratio is so large is the valuation of the GDP
denominator, which at market exchange
rates understates the true size of the
economy. But even allowing for this, the
Chinese economy is extremely open,
reflecting its export-oriented growth
strategy. China now accounts for 7% of
world merchandise exports.
Mechanisms of the 
China effect
How does the growth of such a big
economy affect other parts of the world?
The primary mechanism is via China’s
effects on the global supply of, and
demand for, goods, services and assets.
The resulting shifts in supply and demand
cause changes in prices and hence lead to
adjustment in other countries.
The changes that other countries
experience can be broken down into
‘quantity effects’ and ‘income effects’.
Quantity effects involve some sectors of a
national economy contracting and other
sectors expanding, requiring workers to be
reallocated. In these circumstances there
may be adjustment costs, but if an
economy is operating at full employment,
they are likely to be temporary as workers
are re-employed elsewhere.
Income effects involve changes in a
country’s ‘terms of trade’ – the
relationship between the prices of its
exports and imports. A country will be
better off if the prices of its exports
increase relative to the prices of its imports
– and worse off the other way round. So if
the China effect is to increase the prices of
oil and other commodities while reducing
the prices of some manufactured goods,
commodity-exporting countries will have
their incomes raised while commodity
importers will have their incomes reduced.
Something similar will happen with
manufactures, although here we have to
look carefully at the composition of the
manufacturing trade of the countries
concerned. Countries that tend to export
goods similar to Chinese exports will lose
out, while countries that import the goods
that China is exporting will gain.
In addition to these national level
effects, there will be gainers and losers
within countries as the relative wages of
different types of workers change. The
simple prediction is that unskilled workers
will lose and skilled workers will gain since
what China brings to the world economy
is a large increase in the supply of
unskilled labour.
How does this happen? Again, the
mechanisms are changes in the prices of
goods, with the expectation that the
largest price falls will be for goods where
production relies on unskilled labour, such
as textiles and garments. As Chinese
exports of such goods expand, so their
prices will fall, contracting production and
employment of unskilled labour in other
countries.
So, the overall predictions for the
China effect are that other countries will
gain or lose depending on their trade
patterns. Similarly for workers: expect to
lose out if your skill mix is similar to that
embodied in Chinese exports – and to
gain otherwise.
The changing structure 
of Chinese trade
Since the income and quantity effects of
China are transmitted through trade, the
next step is to analyse the composition of
China’s trade. Figures 2a and 2b show the
growth of China’s exports and imports,
breaking them down into broad
commodity and industrial groupings. 
The first point to note is increasing
Chinese imports of primary commodities.
The reform of the state sector in the mid-
1990s and the rise of the non-state sector
have heralded a second industrialisation in
China, which requires energy and raw
materials. While these commodities
constitute a relatively small share of total
Chinese imports, they are large enough to
impose a major impact on world markets.
Since the mid-1990s, China has
become a net oil importer even though it
is also one of the top ten world producers
of oil. China is the world’s second largest
consumer of oil after only the United
States. And, in 2004, with 4.4% of total
world GDP, China consumed 30% of the
world’s iron ore, 31% of its coal, 27% of
Countries will gain or
lose from the China
effect depending on
their trade patterns
Workers will
lose out if
their skill 
mix is similar
to that
embodied 
in Chinese
exports 
CentrePiece Autumn 2006
13
its steel and 25% of its aluminium.
Between 2000 and 2003, China’s share of
the increase in global demand for
aluminium, steel, nickel and copper was,
respectively, 76%, 95%, 99% and 100%
(Kaplinsky, 2006).
Highly speculative estimates suggest
that demand from China is responsible for
about 50% of the recent boom in world
commodity prices. One effect of this is to
redistribute income between other
countries in the world. Thus, primary
commodity exporters have experienced
dramatic improvements in their export
earnings and terms of trade, which have
been paid for by importers of these
commodities, some of them developed
countries.
At the same time, Chinese exports of
a range of manufactures have resulted in
some substantial price falls. China’s terms
of trade for manufactured goods fell by
14% between 1993 and 2000 (Zheng and
Zhao, 2002). As Figure 3 shows, its overall
terms of trade worsened by 17% between
1980 and 2003 (UNCTAD, 2004).
Moreover, in one-third of 151 industrial
sectors, the prices of Chinese imports into
the European Union have fallen (Kaplinsky,
2006).
Which countries gain and which lose
from these changes? The answer depends
on whether a country is an importer of
these goods (hence benefiting from the
lower prices) or an exporter. Lower prices
of many basic manufactures have been
beneficial for high-income countries that
have already moved out of production in
these sectors, and also for low-income
countries without such manufacturing
capacity.
Lower import prices have also
contributed to a more benign inflationary
environment. Former IMF chief economist
Kenneth Rogoff finds that China’s rapid
global integration and remarkable growth
have generated a favourable terms of
trade shock that produces lower than
expected levels of inflation in the global
economy (Rogoff, 2006).
But what about the competitive threat
that China poses? In some countries in
Latin America (Chile, Costa Rica and El
Salvador), 60-70% of exports are directly
threatened by China’s rise because of a
similar export product mix (Lall and Weiss,
2005). There are concerns for other
developing countries. For example, the
phasing out of the WTO Multi-Fibre
Agreement in 2005, which had previously
limited China’s exports of clothing and
textiles, raised concerns for Bangladesh
and Sri Lanka whose export sectors are
dominated by these goods. And while
China’s rise has induced more imports
from its Asian neighbours, this has not
been enough to offset displacement of
their exports in third country markets
(Greenaway et al., 2006).
But exports of labour intensive
products like clothing, apparel, textiles and
footwear are a rapidly declining share of
China’s trade. These have gone from 40%
of exports in the early 1990s to less than
20% now. Meanwhile, much of the
fastest export growth has been in more
advanced manufactured products,
particularly electrical equipment.
Dani Rodrik argues that China’s export
structure is similar to that of a much
higher income country (Rodrik, 2006). He
looks at disaggregated trade data, and
calculates for each commodity the average
per capita income of countries exporting
that commodity. (Thus, for example,
aircraft are associated with high-income
countries.) He then uses this to look at a
particular country’s export mix, and
calculate the predicted income of the
country, given its export mix.
On average, the prediction and the
actual income coincide, as they must by
construction. But this need not be true for
Source: World Trade Organisation
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Figure 2a:
Total exports from China to the rest of the world, in thousands of US dollars, 1985-2005
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Figure 2b:
Total imports to China from the rest of the world, in thousands of US dollars, 1985-2005
Figure 3:
China’s terms of trade (2000=100)
1980-2004
Source: UNCTAD
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China’s comparative advantage
is increasingly not determined
by low cost labour
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all countries, and there are outliers.
China’s export mix is that of a country
with per capita income three times higher.
This supports the impression from the
export data (in Figure 2a) that there has
been significant upgrading of China’s
exports. 
A key aspect of this upgrading is the
growth of high levels of two-way trade in
similar items, particularly electronics. This
‘intra-industry trade’ reflects cross-border
production networks. For example,
electrical and electronic equipment
comprise 39% of all China’s exports to
Malaysia and 44% of China’s imports from
Malaysia. Electrical and electronic
equipment are 33% of China’s exports to,
and 28% of imports from, Singapore
(Wang, 2003). And the phenomenon is
not limited to developing countries:
vertical intra-industry trade between China
and OECD countries is rising and
accounted for around 20% of trade in the
early 1990s (Hellvin, 1996).
Since around half of China’s exports
have been produced by foreign-owned
enterprises in the past decade, the rise of
intra-industry trade should not be
surprising (Yueh, 2006). Multinational
corporations seek low cost manufacturing
bases and often diversify their production
and supply chains.
Wages, costs and
comparative advantage
What is the China effect on wages? The
simple prediction for the rest of the world
is that skilled workers gain while unskilled
workers lose. Richard Freeman draws
attention to the doubling of the global
labour force that has occurred in recent
years as Asian and former communist
countries have opened up to trade, and
pointed to the likely impact of this on
wages (Freeman, 2004). But neither the
theory nor the evidence is quite this clear
cut.
On the theory side, recent work points
to the possibility that the use of offshoring
and global production chains increases the
efficiency of firms, enabling them to
continue to maintain a presence in high-
income countries (Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2006). On the empirical side,
there has been stagnation of the wages of
unskilled workers, particularly in the
United States. But the evidence suggests
that skill-biased technical change has as
least as much to do with this as does the
rise of trade with developing countries like
China (Machin and Van Reenen, 1998).
It is also interesting to record the
changing patterns of wages in China.
Figure 4 shows that economic growth has
driven up wages in coastal areas, including
Figure 4:
Average annual real wages in selected provinces in renminbi,
1990-2004
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China
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Beijing and Guangdong, to levels double
those in interior provinces like Sichuan and
Guizhou. There has also been an
increasing skill premium, rising since the
beginning of market-oriented reforms
(Knight and Song, 2005). This may be
because China’s administered labour
system meant that wages used to be
centrally determined whereas they are
now more closely linked to productivity or
skills (Yueh, 2004). 
What does this mean for the future?
China’s comparative advantage is no
longer being driven simply by low cost,
abundant labour. Some interior provinces
may still compete on that basis, but for
areas on the coast this advantage has
been substantially eroded and competitive
advantage is increasingly based on skills.
China’s industrial policies are aimed at
technological upgrading, and China is
now graduating well over a million
scientists and engineers each year and a
fast growing number of PhDs (National
Bureau of Statistics, 2005). 
This upgrading will alter the set of
industries that experience competitive
pressure from China, but we must avoid
the fallacy of thinking that all sectors will
suffer. Relative prices and exchange rates
will change, and aggregate effects will
turn on terms of trade effects, as
described above. 
Conclusions
China’s remarkable economic growth in
the past 27 years has propelled it to
become the fourth largest economy in the
world, recently surpassing the UK and
closing in on Germany. Within the next
couple of years, it is likely that the ‘G3’
will consist of the United States, Japan
and China. China’s WTO accession and its
high degree of openness hold several
implications for the global economy:
■ First, there will be sectoral and
employment shifts in other economies
as some industries grow and others
shrink. The development of outsourcing,
offshoring and vertical production
networks, together with the rapid skill
upgrading of the Chinese economy
mean that these effects will be felt not
just in unskilled labour intensive
industries.
■ Second, countries that import from
China (such as the UK) will gain from
lower priced manufactures that
contribute to a low inflationary
environment, while putting pressure on
countries that compete in the same
products (including those in Latin
America). But vast Chinese demand for
raw materials and commodities will
redistribute income from countries that
also demand these resources (developed
countries plus other fast-growing
industrialising countries like India) to
countries that export these products
(such as in Africa). With greater market
opening after WTO accession, there will
be the further prospect of horizontal
intra-industry trade, which will benefit
both developed and developing
countries with competitive products and
services to sell to China.
■ Third, China’s comparative advantage is
increasingly not determined by low cost
labour. A sophisticated technical mix of
export products and a policy focus on
science and technology have resulted in
a diverse set of determinants of
international trade with a great deal of
provincial variability. The evidence
suggests that China’s growing
competitiveness will put pressure on the
productivity of firms and workers
around the world.
■ Fourth, there is some evidence of
increasing wage inequality in developed
countries arising from the growth of
developing countries, including China.
But China’s skills upgrading suggests
that it will not only compete in terms of
cost, but also in more technically
advanced goods, which would affect
the returns to skilled labour elsewhere.
China’s continuing rate of economic
growth is not assured, the road to
development is rocky and the transition to
a market economy is rife with instability.
Yet the country’s remarkable success so far
has already made its economic impact felt
worldwide. Continued growth and global
integration of China will undoubtedly be
of importance for the world economy, and
countries will need to focus on their
competitiveness to benefit. 
Chinese trade
features high
levels of 
two-way
‘intra-
industry
trade’,
reflecting
cross-border
production
networks
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E
very day, 30,000
children die from
diseases that can be
easily prevented or
cheaply cured. This
chronic, daily ‘disaster’
can’t be blamed on a lack of technology: a
recent study by leading health experts
concluded that 63% of child deaths could
be prevented with 24 simple and cost-
effective measures. Nor is poverty to
blame: the cures are inexpensive, and the
success of many poor countries in
lowering mortality is proof enough that
much more can be achieved. 
So why do so many children die, and
what can be done to reduce deaths? In
research with Zhaoguo Zhan, I compiled a
unique set of survey data from 45 low-
income countries to analyse the survival
outcomes of 278,000 children. Our goal
was to measure the relative importance of
socio-economic factors, infrastructure
(such as water and sanitation) and
parents’ health-seeking behaviour in child
survival. We also examined whether
predominantly public or private systems
perform better.
As Figure 1 shows, the three main
killers of children who survive past birth
are diarrhoea, pneumonia and malaria.
These are largely preventable deaths.
Sugar and salt solutions can prevent
dehydration due to diarrhoea. Oral
antibiotics given early enough (and costing
roughly 15 pence per course) can prevent
most pneumonia deaths. And a course of
effective anti-malarial drugs can prevent
deaths for between 10 pence and 50
pence per course.
Faced with these facts, medical
professionals and many people in wealthy
countries conclude that we should expand
and enhance public healthcare to ensure it
reaches the needy populations. This is the
path that countries like Cuba have taken,
and it has generated large declines in child
mortality. 
But in theory, there is a second route
to low mortality. The biological bond
between a parent and child ensures that
parents are their child’s greatest advocates.
If we can help the parent, by providing
better health knowledge and general
education, we may be able to direct that
powerful advocacy to tackle the causes of
child deaths.
And if markets respond to parents
who seek out appropriate care, a private
healthcare sector could arise to provide
adequate services. This second route to
low mortality doesn’t rely on the
continuing goodwill of foreign donors or
domestic elites, and it may prove to be a
more sustainable path to child health.
Our research shows that this second
route is not just a theory. Indeed, Cuba
seems to be the exception. Other places
labelled ‘socialist’ – such as Vietnam and
the Indian state of Kerala – have achieved
low mortality via a large private healthcare
sector. Roughly 50% of child healthcare
services are provided privately in Egypt,
Indonesia and Vietnam. The equivalent
figure is 65% in Kerala, which is
Why do some poor communities have levels of child
mortality as low as those in wealthy countries while
others lose more than a fifth of their children under
the age of five? Research by Peter Boone shows that
the key lies in having parents with good general
education and health knowledge – and the willingness
to seek out modern healthcare.
Cutting 
child mortality:
the power of parents 
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renowned for its good health outcomes.
And in China, 73% of health services are
financed by the user.
This prevalence of private healthcare is
far from the common perception, but it
may provide the key to lasting
improvements in child health. If we can
change demand for health services and
treatment-seeking, we may be able to
generate a sustainable system of
healthcare that leads to low child 
mortality without needing to construct,
finance, motivate and sustain large public
health systems. 
There are two essential outcomes of
our analysis suggesting that much more
focus should be placed on parents when
targeting child mortality. The first is that
child survival depends more on parents’
education and healthcare-seeking activities
than on disease prevalence, nearness of
public services or quality of water and
sanitation infrastructure.
We calculate that if we raise all
parents’ years of schooling to the level in
Egypt (8.3 years for men and 6.3 for
women), child mortality would fall by 19%
in our 45 low-income countries. This is
calculated after controlling for differences
in wealth, so it should reflect the impact of
schooling over and above the influence it
has on incomes and general prosperity.
Using an index that we created, we find
that children of mothers who tend to seek
out modern healthcare have substantially
lower mortality than those who don’t,
once again after controlling for other
socio-economic factors.
In India, the only country where
adequate data are available, we also
examined whether health knowledge or
general education is more important. 
We find that both are highly important,
suggesting that the expansion of 
health knowledge may lead to large
mortality declines if it coincides with
changes in behaviour. 
This large parental role in child health
contrasts with the recommendations of
many health experts, who provide a 
list of urgently needed health services.
They rarely consider health knowledge in
the family and they assume that the
medical profession must bring healthcare
to the household.
Our analysis suggests that, in reality, in
low-income countries, children survive best
when they have educated parents with
health knowledge who choose to seek
modern care, regardless of whether public
clinics are nearby and regardless of how
frequently their children become ill. We
believe this correlation reflects a simple
fact: it is easy to cure the diseases that 
kill children, and parents who know 
how to do this can successfully prevent
child deaths.
The second main outcome of our
analysis is that public health systems in
low-income countries are, on average, no
better at generating equality or reducing
child mortality than private-based systems.
Many public health advocates argue
strongly against a private route to better
healthcare. For example, the World 
Health Organisation’s Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health advocated a
$47 billion expansion of annual public
health provision in poor countries. They
ruled out using the private sector because
they believed it would not adequately
reach the poor, and it would not provide
equivalent quality services. But while this is
plausible, no evidence was offered to back
up these arguments. 
Our research asked parents where they
sought healthcare, so we were able to
measure whether child healthcare was
predominantly private or public. As Figure
2 shows, both public and private systems
have achieved low child mortality. So there
is no evidence to back claims that private-
based systems don’t work well enough.
The inequality of public systems will
come as no surprise to people working in
low-income countries. At Effective
Educated parents seek
out healthcare
regardless of their
proximity to public
health infrastructure
Figure 1:
Estimated causes of post-neonatal child deaths in 2003
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■ Diarrhoea 34%
■ Pneumonia 34%
■ Malaria 14%
■ Other 14%
■ AIDS 4%
Intervention (the organisation I chair), we
are currently designing and sponsoring
several large trials that aim to reduce child
mortality in the poorest regions of India
and Africa.
The public clinics where we work in
Andhra Pradesh are in terrible condition:
absenteeism among doctors is high,
hygiene is poor and facilities lack medicines
and staff to provide even basic services.
While we originally planned to bolster the
public clinics, we have now agreed with the
government and our local partners to run a
well-designed trial that experiments with
contracting out services to the private
sector while also running a large
community health promotion campaign.
The jury is still out, but we hope this new
system will substantially reduce the 5-6%
of babies that die before they are one
month old.
In Guinea-Bissau, which still shows the
destructive effects of civil conflict that
ended eight years ago, military budgets
continue to dwarf state expenditures on
health, and public health clinics are
effectively shells. We are working in a
region where 30% of children die before
the age of five. A vicious combination of
lack of demand for health services due to
poor knowledge and education, combined
with the absence of an effective public
health sector, probably explains the
enormous mortality rates, which hark back
to death rates last seen in Europe over a
century ago. 
Does it make sense to try to rebuild
public systems in countries where instability
and lack of public will mean that they may
not be sustained? Or can better health and
lower mortality levels be achieved by
encouraging and empowering parents to
seek out care for their children in the
private sector?
There is growing evidence that this
second route may work better in many
regions of the world, and if so, perhaps our
current lack of emphasis on education and
knowledge-based routes may help explain
why high child mortality persists, despite
numerous efforts, in many regions of the
world today.
Peter Boone is a research associate in CEP’s
globalisation programme and leads Effective
Intervention, an organisation that sponsors,
designs and runs programmes aimed at
reducing extreme poverty in Africa and Asia
(http://www.effint.org).
His new paper with Zhaoguo Zhan, which this
article summarises, is called ‘Lowering Child
Mortality in Poor Countries: The Power of
Knowledgeable Parents’, CEP Discussion Paper
No. 751 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0751.pdf).
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Figure 2:
The relationship between child mortality and the percentage of child health
services sought in the private sector
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Negotiations for the Doha round of trade liberalisation
have been suspended indefinitely. In the words of Brazilian
foreign minister Celso Amorim, ‘The Doha round is as
near to a catastrophe as one can imagine’.
This outcome was not a foregone conclusion. For the last
six months, a deal had been close, at least in the sense
that its parameters had been fairly well-defined and each
party knew the likely compromises that would be required
to reach an agreement. The United States knew that its
compromise lay in offering more farm subsidy cuts; the
European Union knew it would be required to cut
agricultural tariffs; and the larger emerging countries
knew they would have to offer deeper industrial and
agricultural tariff cuts. Yet after more than five years of
preparations, when the deal was there for the taking,
none of the key players stepped up to make it happen. 
Certainly periods of deadlock and brinkmanship are
common rites of passage for trade negotiations. The
Uruguay round, optimists like to point out, came to a
standstill more than once before reaching conclusion
many years off schedule. But there are several reasons
why the current round has been more complicated than
its predecessors. 
The first new element is the (welcome) presence of the
poorest countries as an organised force in the
negotiations. These countries are right to say that their
circumstances should give them special treatment. But the
political reality is that by offering nothing in return, they
are a drag on the system. The preference-dependent
countries (mainly small states in Africa, the Caribbean and
the Pacific) have a vested interest in the round’s failure: for
them, no deal is a good deal and they have been a thorn
in the side of the round from day one. The larger
developing countries – particularly India and Brazil – have
shown that they are willing to negotiate hard, and even
risk derailing the round to achieve their aims. 
The second reason for slower progress comes from the
political calculus of trade negotiations. The two conditions
for progress are that the net gains outweigh the losses in
each jurisdiction, and that national governments are
strong enough to weather resistance from domestic
opposition. In major countries, political will is low. In 
both France and the United States, unpopular presidents
face or have recently faced elections, and they are in 
no mood to invite further opposition from powerful
farming lobbies.
At this stage, the critical question is whether the collapse
of the Doha round is a catastrophe for the world. As it
stands, the answer is no. The World Bank’s estimates of
likely gains from a successful Doha round are $100 billion,
most of which would accrue to the rich countries. Much
of the remainder (the Bank is at pains to say) would
probably be eroded by concessions on ‘special products’
and other loopholes.
Had the negotiators been more ambitious, perhaps there
would be larger potential gains from a successful
agreement. But with the minimalist agenda that evolved,
it is hard to identify any serious grouping of countries for
which a successful deal is of critical significance. 
The Cairns group of agricultural exporters – a diverse
coalition that includes Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Indonesia, New Zealand and South Africa – is a 
possible exception.
But in the longer run, the collapse of the Doha round may
be more significant. There is a long-term economic cost
that is difficult to quantify, and there is an obvious
symbolic failure. This may undermine the credibility of the
World Trade Organisation and ferment distrust in the
developing countries whose promised ‘development
round’ has conspicuously failed to materialise.
The collapse of the 
Doha trade round
in brief...
Andrew Charlton is a research economist 
in CEP’s globalisation programme, and 
co-author with Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz
of Fair Trade for All: How Trade can
Promote Development (Oxford University
Press, 2006).
The Doha failure may undermine
WTO credibility and ferment
distrust in developing countries 
Doha’s minimalist agenda
meant that a successful deal
was of critical significance
to few countries
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HIV/AIDS prevention:
the potential of primary education
Can education policy offer solutions to Africa’s
AIDS epidemic? Harvard University’s Michael
Kremer, who visited CEP this past summer,
reports on the evidence from four primary
school-based interventions in Western Kenya.
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T
he future course of the
AIDS epidemic in Africa
depends on the
behaviour of the next
generation. Children
aged 5-14 have been
referred to as a ‘window of hope’ because
they have low HIV infection rates and
because their sexual behaviours are not
yet established. In Africa, the majority of
these children now attend some primary
school, which makes school a natural
forum for targeted education on HIV
prevention. 
Many countries, including Kenya, have
incorporated HIV/AIDS education into the
curriculum. Evidence on the effectiveness
of these policies is beginning to emerge,
but many key questions remain: can
teachers deliver the curriculum? Will the
curriculum affect knowledge, attitudes or
behaviour? What should the content
emphasise? And are the policies cost-
effective relative to alternatives, notably
subsidising school attendance, thereby
reducing the cost of education for
families? 
The Kenyan government’s primary
school AIDS prevention program,
established in 1999, is an example of a
policy intervention aimed at reducing risky
behaviour among adolescents. At the heart
of the program is a curriculum covering
basic medical facts about AIDS, HIV
transmission, prevention and care for
people living with AIDS. It has a strong
focus on abstinence and life skills as
effective means to prevent pregnancies and
infection with sexually transmitted diseases.
Although teachers are not trained to
promote condoms, they are given a lot of
discretion in answering pupils’ questions.
Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Samuel
Sinei and I examined the impact of four
school-based interventions on 70,000
pupils from 328 primary schools in Western
Kenya. Some of these schools only
participated in the national AIDS education
program while the others participated in at
least one of four other programs:  
1. The Teacher Training Program, which
provided in-service training for primary
school teachers to enhance the delivery
of the national HIV/AIDS education
curriculum.
2. The Active Learning Reinforcement
Program, which promoted school
debates on the role of condoms and
essay competitions on how pupils can
protect themselves from HIV.
3. The Relative Risk Information Program,
which provided adolescents with
information about variation in HIV
prevalence (risk) by age and sex. This
aimed to reduce cross-generational sex,
which exposes girls to higher HIV risk.
4. The Reducing the Cost of Education
Program, which provided free school
uniforms, with the aim of making
education less costly for families and
keeping teenagers in school longer.
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Knowledge
Mentions abstinence as a way 
to protect from HIV 37% n.s n.s 37% +6 +4
Mentions condoms as a way 
to protect against HIV 32% n.s +9 45% n.s +5
Used properly, condoms can 
prevent HIV transmission 52% n.s +7 64% n.s n.s
Attitudes
People should buy food from 
shopkeeper who has HIV 38% +3 +3 47% n.s n.s
It’s OK to use a condom before 
marriage if one cannot abstain 43% n.s +5 59% n.s n.s
It’s OK to remain a virgin 
while one is a teenager 24% n.s n.s 28% n.s n.s
Behaviour
Has ever had sex 18% n.s n.s 42% n.s n.s
Has ever used a condom, 
if ever had sex 23% n.s n.s 33% +3 +4
Used a condom last time 
had sex, if ever had sex 21% n.s n.s 28% n.s +5
Note: ‘n.s’ means that the difference from ‘National AIDS Program only’ is not statistically significant.
Table 1:
Effects of Teacher Training and Active Learning Reinforcement on knowledge, attitudes
and self-reported behaviours of pupils in grades 6-8 (12 to 16 years old) in 2005
National AIDS
Program only 
Girls
Teacher 
Training
Teacher Training
+ Active Learning
National AIDS
Program only
Boys
Teacher 
Training
Teacher Training
+ Active Learning
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Random selection of schools for
participation in a particular program
meant that, on average, schools
participating and not participating in that
program had comparable characteristics
before the program was implemented.
This made it possible to conduct a
rigorous evaluation of the isolated impact
of each program by comparing the
outcomes of participating schools with
those of schools that did not participate.
In the absence of data on HIV status,
the main outcome of interest was
childbearing: in Kenya, where
contraceptive use (other than condoms) is
very rare among teenagers, the incidence
of childbearing is a good proxy for the
incidence of unprotected sex. 
Teachers at schools that received
training reinforcement are more likely to
teach about HIV/AIDS on a weekly basis,
to use a wider variety of methods to
integrate HIV/AIDS education and to
devote more time to HIV/AIDS education.
They are also more likely to have started a
functional health club, and to have
mentioned HIV and condoms.
But as Table 1 shows, the Teacher
Training Program has had no discernible
impact on knowledge, aside from
increasing the likelihood of boys
mentioning abstinence as a means to
prevent HIV infection. Nor has it had 
a discernible effect on self-reported 
sexual activity: the likelihood of boys
reporting having ever used a condom has
increased, but not the likelihood of them
reporting having used one in their last
sexual encounter.
For girls, there is no evidence that the
program has had an effect on common
measures of the skills needed to resist peer
pressure. After two years, the Teacher
Training Program had had no impact on
teenage childbearing. But girls in schools
that received extra training were more
likely to be married if they had started
childbearing. The impact in terms of HIV
transmission is thus unclear: on the one
hand, early marriage means a lower
lifetime number of partners; on the other
hand, early marriage is often associated
with important age gaps between
spouses. This could increase the risk of HIV
infection among teenage girls since adult
men have a high rate of HIV infection.
The Active Learning Reinforcement
Program seems to have had a little more
impact on attitudes and self-reported
behaviour. Participation in debates and
essays has increased knowledge about
condoms among both girls and boys. Girls
in schools that held a debate and an essay
competition are more likely to mention
condom use as a way to protect oneself
from HIV infection, and more likely to say
condoms can prevent HIV transmission.
Boys are more likely to mention condoms
as a way to protect oneself from HIV and
more likely to report having used a
condom in their last sexual encounter.
Follow-up data on childbearing is not yet
available for this program.
Related research by Pascaline Dupas
(2006) on the Relative Risk Information
Program finds that providing children 
with information on variation in HIV 
rates by age and sex led to a reduction 
in the number of girls engaging in 
cross-generational partnerships. A year
after the program, girls exposed to the
information were 65% less likely to
become pregnant by adult partners. 
Self-reported sexual activity with same-age
partners has increased, but childbearing 
by teenage couples has not increased.
Overall, teenage childbearing was 
reduced by 32% in the year following 
the program.
Finally, as Figure 1 shows, the Reduced
Cost of Education Program has had a
positive effect on the likelihood of pupils
staying in school longer. Two years after
the program inception, those who got free
uniforms were 15% less likely to have
dropped out. Girls from schools where
free uniforms were provided were 10%
less likely to have started childbearing and
12% less likely to be married. 
This article summarises ‘Primary School
Education and HIV/AIDS Prevention:
Evidence from Four School-based
Interventions in Western Kenya’ by Esther
Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael Kremer and
Samuel Sinei (May 2006). The study by
Pascaline Dupas is ‘Relative Risks and the
Market for Sex: Teenagers, Sugar Daddies and
HIV in Kenya’.
Figure 1:
The impact of Reducing the Cost of Education on 
girls enrolled in grade 6 in January 2003 (outcomes 
in October 2005)
Providing information on HIV risk associated with
cross-generational sex reduces the number of girls
having unprotected sex with older partners
Free school
uniforms make
pupils more likely
to stay in school
and reduce
teenage pregnancy
0%
Dropped out Married Is pregnant or
has a child
5%
10%
15%
20%
■ No subsidies provided for education
■ Subsidies provided
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This article summarises The Depression Report:
A New Deal for Depression and Anxiety
Disorders, published in June 2006 by CEP’s
Mental Health Policy group led by the Centre’s
founder director Professor Lord Richard
Layard.
The report was circulated to all readers of The
Observer newspaper in September 2006, with
the financial support of the Charlie Waller
Memorial Trust, set up to commemorate Charlie
Waller who took his own life due to depression at
the age of 28. The report has also received the
support of the Royal College of General
Practitioners and leading mental health charities
– Mind, Rethink, the Mental Health Foundation
and the Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health.
Tackling depression and 
anxiety disorders
Crippling depression and chronic anxiety are the biggest
causes of misery in Britain today. They are the great
submerged problem, which shame keeps out of sight. But
if you mention them, you soon discover how many
families are affected. According to the respected
Psychiatric Morbidity Survey, one in six of us would be
diagnosed as having depression or chronic anxiety
disorder, which means that one family in three is affected.
That is the bad news. The good news is that we now have
evidence-based psychological therapies that can lift at
least a half of those affected out of their depression or
their chronic fear. These new therapies are not endless nor
backward-looking treatments. They are short, forward-
looking treatments that enable people to challenge their
negative thinking and build on the positive side of their
personalities and situations. The official guidelines from
the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) say that
these treatments should be available to all people with
depression or anxiety disorders or schizophrenia, unless
the problem is very mild or recent.
But the NICE guidelines cannot be implemented because
we do not have enough therapists. In most areas, waiting
lists for therapy are over nine months or there is no
waiting list at all because there are no therapists. So if you
go to the GP, all that can be provided is medication (plus a
little counselling at some surgeries). But many people will
not take medication, either because they dislike the side
effects or because they want to control their own mood.
The result is tragic. Only one in four of those who suffer
from depression or chronic anxiety is receiving any kind of
treatment. The rest continue to suffer, even though at
least half of them could be cured at a cost of no more
than £750.
This is a waste of people’s lives. It is also costing a lot of
money. For depression and anxiety make it difficult or
impossible to work, and drive people onto incapacity
benefits. We now have a million people on incapacity
benefits because of mental illness – more than the total
number of unemployed people receiving unemployment
benefits. At one time, unemployment was our biggest
social problem, but we have done a lot to reduce it.
Mental illness is now the biggest problem, and we know
what to do about it. It is time to use that knowledge.
But can we afford the £750 it costs to treat someone?
The money that the government spends will pay for itself.
For someone on incapacity benefit costs us £750 a month
in extra benefits and lost taxes. If the person works just a
month more as a result of the treatment, the treatment
pays for itself. 
So we have a massive problem – the biggest problem that
one in three of our families experience. But we also have
a solution that can improve the lives of millions of
families, and cost the taxpayer nothing. We should
implement the NICE guidelines; and most people with
mental illness should be offered the choice of
psychological therapy. 
in brief...
Most people with
mental illness
should be offered
the choice of
psychological
therapy
Only one in four people who
suffer from depression 
or chronic anxiety 
is receiving treatment
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Civil conflicts continue to affect some of the poorest
countries in the world. Episodes of civil strife are often
driven by poverty and socio-economic inequalities, and
they can lead countries into even starker levels of
deprivation than before the crisis – what is often called
the ‘conflict trap’. 
My research looks at the economic impact of such civil
strife at the individual level. I argue that taking the
individual as the unit of analysis is crucial in economies
that consist mainly of subsistence agricultural households,
and where the provision of health care and access to
education are precarious. By definition, subsistence
households seldom have access to credit, live mostly on
their own agricultural production or rely on informal
markets to buy consumption goods and labour. Such
behaviour has virtually no impact on consumption and
credit figures, so aggregate wealth indicators fail to
account for the effect of conflict on the economic
performance of subsistence households.
Rwanda has experienced sustained waves of ethnic
violence since 1959, with a peak in the intensity of killings
in 1994. These episodes led to massive population
displacements in the 1960s and after 1994. The resulting
refugee populations were placed in camps either within
Rwandan borders or in neighbouring countries. As the
Rwandan conflict has lasted for over 30 years, some of
the displaced were left in camps without economic
prospects for long periods of time. It is only their children,
born in the camps, who returned to Rwanda after 1994.
Those refugees were encouraged by the government to
return en masse to Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. This
resulted in a land and housing crisis, which threatened to
trigger even more violent outbursts. The population
density in Rwanda is one of the world’s highest, and
combined with the collapse of infrastructure resulting
from the conflict, these return migrations put more strain
on the demand for land and housing.
Land plays a critical role within Rwandan society since
most households' survival depends on it. The legislation
defining and enforcing access to land in Rwanda is mostly
based on custom, corresponding more to a ‘right to use’
than to possess. As land became scarcer, there were fewer
opportunities for returnees to rely on custom-based law to
find a parcel of land.
In 1997, the government implemented a policy of ‘village-
isation’, aimed at reducing land-related tensions through a
programme of resettlement and land allocation to post-
1994 returnees. In order to distribute parcels of arable
land to the returnees, the government deforested large
areas and redistributed some of the land left behind by
the 1994 refugees that had not been reclaimed.
The chosen pattern of resettlement was to agglomerate
new housing facilities (or imidugudu) in relatively small
areas on the borders of existing Rwandan villages. 
Other forms of resettlement were forbidden within
programme villages, and all returnees to these areas were
moved into imidugudu. They were then allocated parcels of
land within larger fields, not necessarily positioned
alongside their house. Hence the density of population
within imidugudu was much higher than in traditional
Rwandan villages. It was argued that this would minimise
the amount of wasteland, hence leading to a more efficient
use of the land.
At the time that my data were collected, not all villages
benefited from the programme. Hence it became possible
to compare the economic performance of returning
households that benefited from the programme with those
who did not.
My study of Rwanda is based on the working assumption
that periods spent in camps may have had some impact on
the productivity of returnees, either through a depreciation
of their skills or other sociological or psychological channels.
Isolating the impact of this potential loss of ‘human capital’
on returnees' agricultural productivity relative to that of
stayers is a new contribution to the assessment of the
economic cost of conflict at a microeconomic level, which
may bear important policy implications.
The data allow me to measure whether there are
differentials in agricultural productivity across migration
status. Moreover, exploiting the differences in patterns of
resettlement across imidugudu and traditional villages, I can
examine the impact on agricultural productivity of
assimilation of the returnees with the stayers.
Rwanda: the costs of conflict 
for subsistence households
We know that civil conflict is hugely costly for poor countries but
how can we measure the costs of such strife for individuals?
Florence Kondylis looks at the impact of the waves of ethnic
violence and consequent mass migrations in Rwanda on the
economic performance of subsistence agricultural households.
in brief...
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The government’s
resettlement policy 
is generating 
economic inequality
and potential for
discontent
If we assume that the stock of human capital varies
between returnees and stayers, then assimilation is likely to
be an important channel for returnees to acquire
agricultural skills and knowledge. Exchange of skills
between returnees and stayers is likely to be the fruit of
neighbourhood interactions, and hence depend mainly on
the patterns of settlement. Hence returnees living within
imidugudu are likely to have less interaction with stayers
compared to returnees living within traditional villages.
My results show that for the group of returnees that moved
into imidugudu, who received more land than they would
have otherwise, the programme had a positive asset effect
on their agricultural production. Nevertheless, this group
experienced lower returns to inputs than the group of
returnees who were not in the imidugudu programme. Not
only does this suggest that the episode of displacement
lowered the returnees' level of know-how, but also that the
imidugudu policy did not allow for transfer of skills
between stayers and returnees.
One possible explanation for the differentials in returns
across migration status and programme areas is that there
are ‘social pressures’, such as ethnic stigmatisations in
imidugudu areas. Another possible explanation is that the
land is systematically of lower quality in programme areas.
These findings suggest not only that conflict-induced
migration had a mixed impact on agricultural returns, but
also that the resettlement policy generated further sources
of economic inequality between groups. A straightforward
implication is that in order to prevent discontent from
erupting among certain groups – and thus to promote
durable peace – the sources of disparity should be tackled.
One way of doing this would be to provide agricultural
knowledge and training to the population of returnees in
the programme areas.
This article summarises ‘Agricultural Returns
and Conflict: Quasi-experimental Evidence 
from a Policy Intervention Programme in
Rwanda’ by Florence Kondylis, CEP Discussion
Paper No. 709
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0709.pdf).
Florence Kondylis is a research economist at
CEP and, from October 2006, a postdoctoral
fellow at Columbia University in New York.
Mass migration 
in Rwanda resulting
from the conflict has
had a mixed impact on
agricultural returns 
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Professor Phelps has been recognised ‘for his analysis of
intertemporal tradeoffs in macroeconomic policy’. 
The detailed citation notes that his work on the
microeconomic foundations of wage and price setting is
a precursor of the search and matching theory of
unemployment, where Christopher Pissarides – director of
CEP’s macroeconomics programme – has made especially
important contributions. The citation also refers to the
significant contribution to analysis of unemployment by
CEP’s founder director Richard Layard with Stephen
Nickell and Richard Jackman.
Professor Pissarides comments on the new 
Nobel laureate:
‘The prize was richly deserved. Ned Phelps made
fundamental contributions to the analysis of
economies in which the future has an impact on
what we see happening in the present. Today we
take it for granted that expectations about the
future matter for policy. Phelps was one of the
pioneers of this idea, and it is a measure of his
success that we take it for granted today.’
‘Along with Milton Friedman, Phelps
revolutionised our way of thinking about the
inflation-unemployment trade-off, which has
influenced policy-makers since the 1960s. He
showed that the economy has an ‘equilibrium
unemployment rate’ (known by the name that
Friedman gave to it, the natural unemployment
rate) and attempts to reduce it below that level
by monetary and fiscal policy intervention are
doomed to failure. Left alone, the economy will
get to that level.’
‘But Phelps went beyond the claim of the mere
existence of a natural rate, to show that the
natural rate need not be the optimal rate. So
governments may or perhaps should try and
influence the natural rate, but not with
stabilisation policy. He advocated the use of well-
designed policies aimed at increasing the
attractiveness of low-skilled workers to
employers, and tax policies that give work
incentives to workers with low earned incomes.’
‘One of Phelps’ most important articles – ‘Phillips
Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal
Unemployment over Time’ – was written in 1966
when he was SSRC research fellow at LSE, and
published in Economica, a leading economics
journal edited at the School.’
‘A few years later, his work was instrumental in
my choice of PhD topic, and has since influenced
many of us in our research on unemployment.
Phelps visited LSE frequently to interact with the
economists at CEP, especially during the
preparation of his 1994 book Structural Slumps.
We are all very pleased by the award.’
The full citation is available here:
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2006/ecoadv06.pdf
Edmund Phelps,
Nobel laureate
CEP congratulates Professor Edmund S. Phelps of Columbia
University on being awarded the 2006 Sveriges Riksbank Prize
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.
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